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A Personal Journey
Through Feminist Legal Theory
by Diane M. Bessette*
They sat there in the fresh young darkness close together. Phoeby eager
to feel and do through Janie, but hating to show her zest for life for fear
it might be thought mere curiosity. Janie full of that oldest human longing
- self revelation. Phoeby held her tongue for a long time, but she couldn't
help moving her feet. So Janie spoke.'
Zora Neale Hurston
Last fall I took on an independent study in order to dive
into the subject of feminist legal theory. This Essay is the written
result of that work.
I originally intended to weave an analysis of feminist legal theory
into a work on literature by a woman writer. I read the writings of
women from Sor Juana Inez de la Cruz and Emily Dickinson to
Andrea Dworkin and Florynce Kennedy. I also read articles and
books by the leading feminist legal theory scholars (fem-crits). After
reading, thinking and discussing these issues with friends, I decided
on a patchwork approach to the subject. This approach allows me
to expose some ideas which I hope will stimulate the reader to
explore this subject more. The literary focus of my work has evolved
into selections of works of poetry by women to introduce the
different sections of this Essay.
In the first sections of the Essay I attempt a brief description
of feminist legal theory. This discussion concentrates on the work
of three leading fem-crits and explains the two major schools of
feminist legal theory, cultural feminism and radical feminism. In the
second section, I offer stories of women's lives. Professor Robin
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West, one of the fem-crits described in the first section, is the
leading proponent of a fem-crit movement that says that women
must tell true stories of their lives in order to show how we are left
out of the legal system. In the third part, I explain why women in
the generation currently entering the legal profession need to be
aware of feminist legal theory and what role we can play to improve
the lives of women in our society. So I suppose I can describe my
paper by saying that first, it offers some basic explanations of
feminist legal theory, then it applies some of the theory to personal
situations. Finally, I propose a call to action.
Here I am, seated, with all my words,
like a basket of green fruit, intact.
The fragments
of a thousand destroyed ancient gods
seek and draw near each other in my blood. They long
to rebuild their statue.2
Rosario Castellanos
In the first section of this Essay, I provide a brief primer on
feminist legal theory. I have chosen to concentrate on the works of
three women: Carol Gilligan, Catharine MacKinnon, and Robin
West. Although Gilligan is a sociologist and not a law professor, she
must be included since her work has become saturated into the
entire genre of feminist legal theory. MacKinnon is probably the
best known fem-crit outside of the fem-crit community because her
work has been widely published. I include her because her viewpoint
is decidedly non-mainstream and she writes in a bold and
empowering style. Finally I focus on West because I see her work
as bringing us forward.
A major weakness in these choices is that all of the fem-crits




are white. The women's movement has undergone some well-
deserved bashing from women of color for ignoring their concerns.
As Audre Lorde puts it, "Some problems we share as women, some
we do not. You fear your children will grow up to join the
patriarchy and testify against you, we fear our children will be
dragged from a car and shot down the street, and you will turn your
backs upon the reasons they are dying."3
In my choices for the literary notations I have selected
exclusively works by women of color, partly to make up for the
choices regarding theory but mostly because these women say, in
words more powerful than words of most white women, what needs
to be heard. This whole issue has been a source of frustration for
me. As a straight white woman, I cannot pretend to speak for
women of color, lesbians, physically challenged women. I invite
women of all groups to ponder my words and write their own stories
so that we may begin to understand the differences within ourselves.
A
New grass grows on the ancient ramparts.
On the abandoned monuments
The old inscriptions are lost in time.
I am bound on a journey without end,
And cannot bear the song of the cuckoo.
4
Sun Yun-feng
If there is one word that causes the fem-crits more trouble than
any other, it is the word "different". The intellectual struggle goes
something like this: "We want to be treated equally but in some
ways we're different. But the ways we're different are ways that
have been defined by men. Yes, but we like how we're different so
maybe it's ok. No it's not, we have to define how we're different
3. Lorde, Age, Race, Class, and Sex Women Reddfining Difference, SISTER OUrSIDER 114,
117 (1984).




ourselves. Oh and by the way, don't treat us differently, except in
ways that we're different."
Confused? You're not alone. The confusion rises all the way
to the United States Supreme Court. Look, for example, at the way
it has addressed the issue of pregnancy and women. In Geduldig v.
Aiello5, the Court held that according to the United States
Constitution, pregnancy discrimination had nothing to do with sex
discrimination. Instead the Court created a distinction between
pregnant women and "non-pregnant people." Then, with the
enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 19786, the Court
was forced to consider pregnancy discrimination from a statutory
viewpoint. Based on this analysis, the Court found that sex
discrimination encompassed pregnancy discrimination. The members
of the Court came to the stunning conclusion that pregnancy is one
way that women are different from men.7
Some people say, 'You're asking for it both ways." Not really.
We are merely pointing out that society and our legal system must
also begin to view life and issues through the eyes of all women.
Our legal system claims a sort of obliquely blind rationality as its
cornerstone. But legal terms, crimes, standards of reasonableness,
and judicial tests are defined with words by people. Up to now,
these people have been almost exclusively male. A certain
subjectiveness is bound to come through. As Martha Minow says,
"The inconsistency lies in a world and set of symbolic constructs that
simultaneously used men as the norm and denigrated any departure
from the norm."
A perfect example of how men's needs are the standard is the
traditional law firm career path. If a man hopes to make partner in
the typical seven to nine years, he normally takes no substantial
leaves of absence. Traditionally, he didn't have to, and if he did, it
was certainly not to raise a child, since in our society child-rearing
has been the primary responsibility of women.
Enter large numbers of women into the legal profession. Now
5. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1978).
7. Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987).




the career path considerations become more complicated--for
women. -Because the primary responsibility for child-rearing has
remained on women, substantial numbers of women attorneys are
faced with the quandary of motherhood versus career, an issue men
almost never face.
Rather than attempting to view this issue from the standpoint
of the group of people most affected by the issue, managing
partners and other law firm policy makers have continued to view
parenthood and careers from a traditional man's perspective.
Consequently, the legal profession has made nothing more than
minor and inconsequential changes that are still based upon the
view that a career is a man's perogative. These changes create a
sub-class of women who often end up either leaving firms or
remaining in a permanent associate status for which we are
supposed to be grateful.
That one word "different" has caused as much dissension within
the community of fem-crits as it has in the legal community at large.
What has emerged are two major schools of feminist legal theory:
the first is termed "cultural" or "female voice" feminism; the second
is called "radical" or "dominance-power" feminism.
B
My grandmothers are full of memories.
Smelling of soap and onions and wet clay
With veins rolling roughly over quick hands
They have many clean words to say.9
Margaret Walker
The "cultural" path has been fueled by the writings of Carol
Gilligan -- principally her 1982 book, In A Different Voice. Using
sociological studies, Gilligan hypothesizes that women and men have
different ways of moral reasoning. As women we are socialized to
9. Walker, Lineage, in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF WOMEN PoETS 346.
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build our lives around caring for others and to base 6ur lives on a
web of relationships. Consequently, the moral reasoning of women
tends to be more contextual and subjective.
Men, on the other hand, are socialized to build their lives
around individual achievement and scientific clarity. Consequently
the moral reasoning of men tends to be based on linear logic and
normative truths.10
Gilligan's classic example of this dichotomy is the story of Amy
and Jake. As part of a sociological study, each child is asked to
morally analyze the situation of Heinz. Heinz' wife is dying and he
is too poor to buy the medicine she needs. What should Heinz do?
Jake sees the dilemma as "sort of like a math problem with
humans."'" He says that human life is worth more than money and
therefore Heinz should steal the medicine. Amy does not see the
problem as an either/or situation. She suggests that Heinz and the
pharmacist get together and work out a solution that will work for
all concerned. She notes that if Heinz did steal the medicine, he
might have to go to jail and would then be unable to help his wife
and she might get sick again.'2
Fem-crits have moved beyond a strong embrace of Gilligan's
theory. One of the main reasons for this is that Gilligan's theory
has been construed to mean that there is just one female voice, an
analysis alienating to women who don't fit into the dominant
categories of white, heterosexual, Christian and able-bodied.
Nevertheless, the appeal of Gilligan's proposition remains a focal
point in the writings of fem-crits. In an issue of the Journal of Legal
Education published in the summer of 1988, 11 of the 13 articles
printed as part of the theme "Women and the Law" cite Gilligan's
work.'3
10. Here I make the obligatory disclaimer that Gilligan does not purport that the female
voice exists only and completely in women nor the male voice only in men. Rather, she
discusses prevalent behavior patterns.
11. C. GILuGAN, IN A DiFFERENr VoicE 26 (1982).
12. Id. at 28.




And one day, all under heaven
Will see beautiful free women,
Blooming like fields of flowers,
And bearing brilliant and noble human beings. 14
Ch'iu Chin
Catharine MacKinnon offers a succinct and effective rebuttal
to the relational analysis. While praising Gilligan for giving dignity
to the idea of gender differences in moral reasoning, she says that
ultimately Gilligan:
achieves for moral reasoning what the special protection rule
achieves in law: the affirmative rather than the negative valuation
of that which has accurately distinguished women from men, by
making it seem as though those attributes, with their
consequences, really are somehow ours, rather than what male
supremacy has attributed to us for its own use.u
MacKinnon continues by stating that:
women value care because men have valued us according to the
care we give them... Women think in relational terms because
our existence is defined in relation to men.... All I am saying is
that the damage of sexism is real, and reifying that into differences
is an insult to our possibilities.
16
MacKinnon offers a more radical view of feminist legal theory-
-based on the notions of power and control. MacKinnon calls her
analysis "the dominance approach". 7 She first observes that "an
14. Chin, To The Tune 'The River Is Red', in THE PENGUIN BOOK OF WOMEN PoETS 281
(1976).
15. C. MACKNNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 38 (1987).
16. Id at 39.
17. Id at 40.
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equality question is a question of the distribution of power. Gender
is also a question of power, specifically of male supremacy and
female subordination."'18
In her writing MacKinnon repeatedly cites striking statistics that
show how women are victimized as a class in ways in which men
largely are not. The statistics range from economic figures
demonstrating that women earn about half of what men earn to
those relating to violence which tell us that 44 percent of all women
in the United States are victims of rape or attempted rape, at least
25 to 33 percent of women are battered in their homes and 70
percent of murdered women are murdered by a husband, lover or
or ex-lover.'9 According to MacKinnon, "[t]he whole point of
women's social relegation to inferiority as a gender is that for the
most part these things aren't done to men."w0
There is also a marxist element to MacKinnon's theory. She
proposes that feminism, like marxism, is a theory of the unequal
distribution of power. MacKinnon sees definitions of sexuality as
determining patterns of dominance. She states that "the molding,
direction, and expression of sexuality organize society into two sexes,
women and men. This division underlies the totality of social
relations; it is as structural and pervasive as class is in marxist theory
• . ."21 Finally MacKinnon calls for a society that allows women to
take an equal position of power in society and to define what is
important to us.
MacKinnon is, of course, right. Men have ruled Western society
throughout its history. As rulers, they have defined the role of
women as caretakers and nurturers. Likewise "equality" is viewed
from the vantage point of men. But emotionally I cannot throw out
the relational-voice analysis. I cannot think of or find words better
than those below to express how I feel.
I like and use the "female voice" metonymy because for me it
works: it seems to help explain some troubling existential
quandaries in a way that energizes rather than anesthetizes. The
18. Id.
19. Id at 41, 51, 52.




idea that "male.voice" rationality is not the only form of legitimate
thought is really liberating: it encourages one to strive for
ideological freedom, self-understanding, and social change. It is an
adrenalin rush that wakes one up from the stupor of accepting the
status quo without question or recognition of the choices
involved.2
Call me an apologist for the male-dominated structure, but I
see a lot of good in embracing the practices of nurturing and caring
for others, in basing moral decision-making on webs of relationships
instead of individual victories. Since men delegated these societal
roles to women, one may logically say that this means men value
these roles less than the goals and characteristics dominant in men.
This may be so. This delegation leaves women with a wonderful
opportunity to change society.
I'm not sure which is more utopian: the MacKinnon "let us
define ourselves" model or a model that challenges women to use
their admittedly male-imposed characteristics to build a world that
is less combative and more oriented to finding solutions that benefit
all concerned.
22. Worden, Overshooting the Target: A Feminist Deconstnuction of Legal Education, 34




Soft grey ghosts crawl up my sleeve
to peer into my eyes
while I within deny their threats
and answer them with lies.
Mushlike memories perform
a ritual on my lips
I lie in stolid hopelessness
and they lay my soul in strips23
Maya Angelou
Robin West is leading a new movement in feminist legal theory,
which calls on women to change the legal system by telling "true
stories of women's lives".24 In fact, The Los Angeles Times referred
to Professor West in a recent article as a "storytelling feminist",2
West's rationale for storytelling actually is based on traditional
jurisprudence. First she explains that basic jurisprudence begins with
descriptions of human nature. She goes on to say that we must
begin with descriptions of women.2
According to West, women must tell true stories in order to
demonstrate the gap between how human nature is perceived and
explained in traditional legal theory and how women's nature is
defined in feminist legal theory.27 As she says, "feminists take
women's humanity seriously, and jurisprudence does not, because
the law does not."2 West puts out a call for women to
flood the market with our own stories until we get one simple
point across: men's narrative story and phenomenological
description of law is not women's story and phenomenology of
23. M. ANGELoU, Remembering, in MAYA ANGELOU POEMS 11 (1986).
24. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CMi. L. Rav. 1, 64 (Winter 1988).
25. LA. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, at V8.





law. We need to dislodge legal theorists' confidence that they
speak for women, and we need to fill the gap that will develop
when we succeed in doing so.29
West's ideas about "storytelling" receive support from other
members of the fem-crit community. Martha Minow also counsels
us that "distinctive aspects of women's experiences and perspectives
offer resources for constructing more representative, more empathic,
more creative and, in general, better theories, laws and social
practices."' 3
In that spirit, I offer these stories.
29. Id. at 65.












a mist of sweat
dampens








leaning against the door jamb
looks back
lingering
to sniff at a green plum 3'
Li Ching-chao
Two Hastings students, one female .and one male, are drinking
coffee in the cafeteria. Soon another woman sits down with them.
I'm sitting at the next table and can't help overhearing the
conversation.
The first woman says, "I don't think I can do this law journal
note. I mean, how can I possibly know enough to write about a
legal issue? I'm just a student." She tells the other students about




her topic, which has strong social justice ramifications. Her voice is
strained and she looks like she's about to start crying. I can see the
pain in her face and I recognize signs of self-doubt. I've been there.
The man responds, "You have every right to write a journal
note. After all you are smart enough to get into one of the top 20
law schools in the country." She looks unconvinced.
The woman tries another angle. "I know how you feel. Just take
it one step at a time. It will help that you're writing about
something that means something to you personally." Then she joked,
'If I can do it, anyone can."
On my way home that night, I thought about this conversation.
First it struck me that I have never heard a male law student
express that kind of self-doubt about his intellectual abilities. Then
I thought about the responses of the man and woman who tried to
offer their encouragement. Both responses were textbook Gilligan:
the man's was full of linear logic, citing numbers and status all
adding up to some sort of rational right. The woman, on the other
hand, related to the woman, and advised the woman to put the
situation in context. She also used self-deprecating humor. More
than an explanation of Gilligan's theory, this story paints a picture
of the limitations and challenges many women law students feel, in
one way or another. Whether the limits are self-imposed or imposed
by the patriarchy is something we all need to explore.
B
What a happy pilgrimage!
What laughter and joy! ...
And my eyes meanwhile
are full of tears."32
Rosalia de Castro
I cry very easily. It is a physical and emotional characteristic I
32. de Castro, Long May, in THE PENGuiN BooK OF WOMEN PoErS 169 (1976).
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have dealt with for as long as I can remember. Little girls are
allowed to cry, so it was ok when I was younger. Still I remember
being in the sixth grade and discussing ecology with one of my
teachers, whom I'll call Mr. Smith. I didn't actually shed tears but
my eyes got all full of water and my voice cracked a bit. He said
something about not getting so upset about baby seals, and suddenly
I felt veiy weak. I wanted to say that I wasn't really upset, that
crying was just something that I do.
This story has been replayed with different "Mr. Smiths" through
high school, college and jobs I have had in Boston, Washington,
D.C., New York and Sacramento. The "Mr. Smiths" were professors,
bosses, and friends. They were also usually men. I could never seem
to make them understand that I was not really upset. Crying is just
something that I do.
This past fall I read what Robin West said about telling our
stories and I thought about my experiences with crying. I mentioned
this to a friend. Very matter-of-factly she said, "Oh you mean
crying as a form of expression," as though everyone knew that is
what crying is. I had never been able to explain that crying is not a
sign that something is deeply wrong; it's just a way I show that I
care.
As I write, this section, I can hear the symphony of some men
and not a few women saying, "This isn't legal writing, it's not a legal
issue." And I also see lots of women leaning back in their rocking
chairs, thinking to themselves, "Crying -- that's happened to me too."
And that gives me courage.
How does this relate to feminist jurisprudence? Well it's about
seeing things, including behavior patterns, in a new way. And it's
about realizing that the way men as a class define "proper" forms of
expression, or "proper" standards of reasonableness, or even
"correct" legal rationality, isn't how we all see it. And directly it is
saying "Don't see me as a weaker person because I cry. See me as
passionate, committed and expressive." The legal system must begin





I tried to tell her:
This way the twig is bent.
Born of my trunk and strengthened by my roots,
You must stretch newgrown branches
Closer to the sun
Than I can reach. 33
Naomi Long Madgett
What power will feminist legal theory have in the present legal
system and in our society? Will these theories effectively contribute
to change, to make the law reflect the needs and interests of
women? The generation of women just now going through law
school and entering the legal profession will be the test.
We are not the vanguard. The vanguard includes the pioneer
women who fought for the right to attend law school. They include
Belva Lockwood, Myra Bradwell and Hasting's own Clara Foltz.34
The vanguard also includes the women who went through law school
in the late 60s and early 70s. In 1964, women composed only four
percent of law students in the United States. Over the years, the
percentage of women law students grew to 40 percent in 1984. 3 The
women who went through law school during these years of growth
fought and sometimes sued for the right to be on law reviews and
to receive equal treatment in placement offices and hiring6. To
them we owe a great big THANK YOU and a lot of respect.
In 1984, the American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a
major survey on women in the law. The results of that survey
include the fact that while women currently make up 20 percent of
the attorneys in the United States Black women attorneys make up
less than one percent of the attorneys. Currently women make up
41.5. percent of the people in law school. Indeed, 75 percent of all
33. Madgett, Offspring, in THE THIRD WOMAN 255 (1980).
34. Foltz v. Hastings, 54 Cal. 28 (1879).
35. K. MoRLLO, THE IVhmIsiL BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMEIucA. 1638 To THE
PRESENT 248 (1986).
36. Id. at 86.
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the women practicing law today graduated from law school after
1970.37 Never before in the history of the legal profession has there
been such a rapid and substantial infusion of a class of people into
the legal profession. When I visualize those numbers and the
strength those numbers can bring, it seems that substantial change
is our destiny.
Our generation has the opportunity to use the strength of our
numbers to change the legal system. Women going through law
school and beginning a legal career have the opportunity to guide
the legal profession and the justice system in directions never before
considered. We must not let that opportunity pass by.
To realize why we need to change the law, consider personal
stories like the ones above or ponder any of your own experiences.
Alternatively, if you prefer linear logic, you can look at the numbers.
According to statistics determined by the American Bar
Association, eight percent of the partners in large firms are women.
The percentage rises to 13 percent among all law firms. On its face,
and considering that three-fourths of the women attorneys
graduated from law school after 1970, that doesn't sound too bad.
But next consider that the percentage of women partners is growing
by just one percent a year, which means that by the year 2000, only
20 percent of partners in law firms will be women.3
Then there's the money issue. According to a 1984 ABA survey
of 3000 attorneys, male junior associates average an income of
$30,000, while women average $25,000. Similarly, male partners
annual earnings average $75,000 compared to women partners
$50,000.
More disturbing are the effects a legal career has on women's
lives. Compared to men attorneys, women attorneys are more likely
to be divorced (13 percent to four percent), single (22 percent to 15
percent), and childless (56 percent to 40 percent).3 9 These statistics
indicate that women are being forced into a male mold,
unsuccessfully. Not surprisingly, the survey found that "almost twice
as many women as men working in private practice are dissatisfied
37. ABA JouRNAL, June 1, 1988 at 49-50.
38. Id. at 70.
39. Id. at 72.
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with their jobs.' 40
The statistics demonstrate how women as a class as well as
women as lawyers continue to be denied equal stature and
opportunity. By trying to fit into the male mold, we are in effect
limiting ourselves. It is in response to this self-limiting process that
the methods and theories of feminist jurisprudence offer an
empowering spirit. This spirit will help us to define our own role
and to seek equal and just treatment as lawyers and as women.
Another way of stating it comes from Gloria Steinem. At a
recent college graduation she said, "I'll know we're getting
someplace when as many young men as young women ask, 'How
can I combine a career and family?"' 41
As I finish this litany of facts and figures on female attorneys,
I consider how narcissistic the concern for corporate lawyers salaries
really is. The problems of women attorneys are real but I see a
greater need - a need for universal sisterhood.
In spite of the barriers of race, class, language, religion and
other socially imposed factors, women share a common bond. I think
that as women attorneys' with the knowledge and the ability to
influence society, we have an opportunity and an obligation to
remember our sisters and to fight for social justice.
Yes, I have worked haid to get where I am and where I'm
going. But there's a fair amount of luck or fate involved too. Simply
put, other women have not had the privileges that many of us have
had. Still, as women we share common experiences and it seems
that if women are to move forward, we must move forward
together.
The best way I have thought of to describe feminist legal theory
is to think of it as providing a technicolor advantage to all things
legal. Sometimes black and white is good. Sure I enjoyed Woody
Allen's Manhattan and I'd like to sue Ted Turner for colorizing
Casablanca. Still when we think about it, most of us prefer to
watch movies in color. Color provides a completeness and a sense
40. M
41. Address by Gloria Steinem, 1987 University graduation (May 1987) quoted in The
Tufts Criterion, Summer 1987, at 17.
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of dramatic truth that black and white can't capture. So it is with
feminist jurisprudence.
Feminist legal theory provides the best sources for grounding
one's thoughts and dreams. It will empower you, educate you, and
make you think in ways you never considered before. It helps us to
speak our truths. We must ensure that our truths are considered in
the development of society.
These fragmented verses
Are only drops of spray
On the sea of knowledge.
Yet they are bright shining
Multitudinous stars, inlaid
On the skies of the heart.
42 "
Ping Hsin
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